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Abstract: Recent investigations have uncovered large, consistent deviations from the predictions of Homo 
economics that individuals are entirely self-regarding. Our study undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior 
search for the evidences of other-regarding behaviors and its ethnic difference, and accounted for by anatomy 
of culture. This study recruited 90 subjects of three ethnic groups from market trade-based (ethnic Han), 
nomadism-based (ethnic Zang) and agriculture-based (ethnic Bouyei) areas in China and conducted public 
good provision experiment with stranger-treatment design. Under the assumption of self-regarding 
preferences, the Nash equilibrium is zero contribution by all in public account using backward induction. 
However, we found contributions did not reduce to zero over all three sessions. Besides, the differences in 
contributions between ethnicities strongly depended on the degree of ethnic dominance, and Zang harbored 
the strongest reciprocal preference generally over all group structures. A particular set of measurable factors 
was identified as proxies for cultural influences on behavioral differences observed in experiments between 
ethnicities. The results showed all of the cultural factors accounted for the behavioral differences between the 
ethnic Han and the other two minor ethnicities. However, behavioral difference between minor ethnicities 
was attributed to group structure only. (1) People may harbor various forms of prosocial emotions in 
economic affairs, and especially exhibit stronger at the initial phase rather than what canonical model 
assumes. (2) Behavioral differences between ethnicities are prominent and can be explained by differences in 
cultural influence. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A number of recent contributions have shown the consistent deviations from the predictions of orthodox 
economics of Homo economics by detecting the other-regarding behaviors, i.e., prosocial behavior, in 
economic affairs (Andreoni, 1990; Camerer, 1997; Henrich, 2000; Glaeser et al., 2000). According to cultural 
psychological theories, fundamental differences in how culture affects people’s perception of the world might 
predict differences in how people make economic decisions (Miller, 1984; Shweder, 1990; Triandis, 1995). In 
recent years, much experimental work has focused on cultural effects on prosocial behaviors (e.g., Burlando 
and Hey, 1997; Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999; Henrich, 2000; Glaeser et al., 2000; Fershtman, Gneezy, 2014; 
Castro, 2008). However, these studies merely report the differences in prosocial behavior between ethnic 
groups and naturally attribute the effects culture has on behavior to the individual level. Culture is difficult to 
univocally define, although most commonly this term is used for tribes or ethnic groups (in anthropology) or 
for nations (in political science, sociology and management) (Hofstede, 2011). Until recently, economists have 
been reluctant to rely on culture as a possible determinant of economic phenomena. Much of this reluctance 
stems from the very notion of culture: it is so broad and the channels through which it can enter the economic 
discourse is so ubiquitous (and vague) that it is difficult to design testable (i.e., refutable) hypotheses (Guiso 
et al., 2006). A very small amount of research has conducted analysis of the economic anatomy of culture. The 
work of Chuah, Hoffmann and Williams (2009) examines bargaining behavior in an experimental ultimatum 
game with Malaysian and UK subjects and assesses to what extent attitudes in terms of culture may be 
responsible for the prosocial behavioral differences using a number of comprehensive attitudinal surveys of 
individuals sourced from the fourth wave (1999-2000) of the World Values Survey (WVS, see Inglehart, 
1997). Other research has mainly focused on the effects of religions (Sosis and Ruffle, 2004; Benjamin et al., 
2013).  
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In this study, we defined culture in a sufficiently narrow manner (i.e., the culture of a particular people is a 
shared set of beliefs, values, conventions, ethnic affiliations and way of economic life) to make it easier to 
identify the causal links from culture to prosocial behavior. This study proceeded as follows: (1) We framed 
the standard linear public good provision games and conducted three treatments based on the games by 
manipulating the ethnic composition of the experimental groups, and then, detected the prosocial behavioral 
differences between ethnicities. (2) We next assess whether, and if so, in what ways, our subjects’ different 
cultural backgrounds generated any observed behavioral differences between ethnicities. Based on our 
definition of culture, we collected a number of survey questions, including questions sourced from WVS and 
regarding family status information, to combine with our own questions (Prosocial Preference Survey, PPS. 
See Table 7). All the questions were grouped into five independent sections that can provide measurements of 
dimensions of culture in terms of prosocial preferences1: people’s attitudes toward participation, out-group 
rejection (desirability as neighbors), religion, market interaction, and centralization of power of a family. 
After the completion of the experimental game, we distributed the questionnaire to collect the survey data 
from every subject during an interval of 30 to 40 min. Then, we assess whether the differences in various 
corresponding dimensions of culture exist between ethnicity. This study is intended to account for the ethnic 
behavioral difference by more enriched anatomy of culture (including both potential cultural dimensions- 
attitude and objective way of economic life- according to the results of related studies) in order to reveal the 
pattern of cultural influence on the ethnic behavioral difference more completely. This paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 introduces our experimental design. Section 3 first provides the results of investigations 
into behavioral differences in public good provision games and then identifies to what extent dimensions of 
culture may be responsible for the behavioral differences in contributions observed in experiments 
associated with different ethnicities. Finally, we present the conclusions and discussion in Section 4. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
 
The experiment was conducted at the Southwest University for Nationalities, China. A total of 90 subjects 
were equally divided between three ethnicities. Our sampling has the following considerations. First, we 
selected subjects from the ethnic Han group, which is the majority, and from two ethnic minority groups, the 
ethnic Zang, which is the largest minority group, and the ethnic Bouyei, which is a relatively small minority 
group in China, to make a greater variation in ethnic population scales2. Second, these ethnicities exhibit 
different economic conditions. The ethnic Zang and Bouyei practice nomadism and agriculture respectively, 
while the ethnic Han live in a commercial economic society. Third, the participants are almost entirely 
freshmen who have entered into college for less than three months and grew up in the original regions of the 
ethnicities3. This is expected to reduce the influences from other cultures and customs. Fourth, our 
recruitment proceeded in the following manner: after obtaining the subject’s file from the dean’s office, we 
contacted their counselors to inform the subjects to take part in the experiment rather than put up 
advertisements, which would likely have induced sample selection bias; i.e., those who came to the game 
could have had stronger cooperative tendencies. Additionally, we recruited from a wide range of fields such 
as Economics, Ethnology, Sociology, Chemistry, Biology, Psychology, Physics, Linguistics and Business.  
 
The whole experiment was divided into two phases with 45 participants in each phase. In the first phase, we 
conducted 3 consecutive treatment sessions, each composed of 10 decision-making rounds. In other words, 
participants played 30 rounds of public good provision games in total. In the first treatment session, all the 
subjects were randomly divided into 9 groups, and every group had 5 subjects who were aware that they 
played in a group comprised of different ethnicities (labeled ‘diverse group’). In the second treatment session, 
the subjects were randomly divided within a sample of their own ethnicity (labeled ‘homogeneous group’). In 
the third treatment session, we firstly randomly selected 9 subjects equally from three ethnicities and then 
matched every subject with 4 other subjects different from his/her ethnic affiliation from the rest of the 
                                                          
1 WVS includes a broad scope and wide-ranging poll of socio-economic and political values and consists of more than 200 individual 
questions. 
2 The population proportion in China of Han, Zang and Bouyei are 91.6%, 0.47% and 0.22%, respectively (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China. China Statistical Yearbook. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/rkpc/6rp/indexch.htm).  
3 Five participants quit the experiment for personal emergencies and another five subjects who shared their same ethnicities, but study 
in higher grade were instead.  
96 
 
subjects (labeled ‘one ethnicity dominant group’). To avoid the order effect, in the second phase, we 
conducted the treatment sessions in the following order: the ‘homogeneous group,’ the ‘one ethnicity 
dominant group’ and then the ‘diverse group’. Most experiments usually provide predictions of behavior by 
playing repeated games with subjects as many one-shot games. However, the results from Botelho, Harrison, 
Pinto Costa and Rutström (2009) argue that there is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, 
and the assumption that subjects treat random strangers designs as if they were one-shot experiments is 
false; thus, a reputation effect may develop. Therefore, the group structures were public information over all 
sessions, although the subjects were not allowed to obtain the information on recruitment numbers of any 
ethnicity and types of ethnicities to make them feel there was no chance that they would meet the same 
person in any other round to rule out reputation effects as well as effects of ethnic stereotype, and thus 
develop an instinct towards prosocial behavior (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2014). 
 
All sessions used the standard linear public good provision game including both neutrally worded and 
written instructions (See Appendix B). Five subjects in a group were endowed with 50 tokens each at the 
beginning of each round and each token was converted into money using an exchange rate of 1RMB 
(0.16US$)4 at the end of the experiment. They decided on the allocation of their endowment between a 
private and public good. Each token held in private earned one token for the participant only whereas each 
token placed in the public good earned 0.5 times the token for each member of group. Let (0 50)i ig g   
be the subject
'i contribution to the group account and let i be the payoff given by  
5
1
50 0.5 (1)i i i
i
g g

     
We followed the experimental design of Neugebauer, Perote, Schmidt and Malte (2009) and asked subjects to 
report the guess values of the mean group contribution after the decision-making in each round, and they 
received information feedback about the actual mean group contribution at the end of each round. Note that 
by requiring the reporting of the expected mean contributions, we might be forcing subjects to think more 
carefully about his/her economic decision than they otherwise would have. The total payoffs of a subject in 
each round included the payoffs from the group project as well as from guessing (Appendix B provides the 
computational formula of the payoffs). At the end of the experiment, the final payoff each subject received 
was his/her average payoff over 30 rounds5. 
 
3. Results 
 
In this section, we provide detailed descriptions and statistical tests of the results. We focused on the 
behavioral differences from the experiment in Section 3.1. In section 3.2, we assessed to what extent the 
corresponding indicators from PPS were responsible for the behavioral differences associated with ethnicity 
observed in the experiment. A description of the variables is presented in Table 1. 
 
Results from experiment on behavioral differences  
 
A. Are there any differences in the trends of the contributions over time between ethnicities? 
Result A: The results from the ethnic Bouyei and Han are supportive of declining trends of contributions, whereas 
the results from ethnic Zang show a roughly increasing trend. Moreover, the guess values gradually decrease 
over time for all ethnicities. 
 
The three ethnicities exhibited distributions with no contributions at full-riding and full cooperation. The 
results from the total sample did not strongly support the declining trend of contributions, and trends were 
                                                          
4 ‘RMB’ is the Chinese currency, and the exchange rate was 6.1 RMB per dollar in November, 2014. Herein, we provide both values as 
RMB (US$). 
5 The final payoff each subject received was determined by the total payoff of the whole game (e.g., Putterman L and Anderson, 2006; 
Neugebauer, Perote, Schmidt and Malte, 2009) rather than in a random manner (e.g., Anderson, Mellor and Milyo, 2008) because in each 
round, participants may believe that there is a low possibility (1/30) that this round will be selected and hence do not treat it carefully. 
Hence, the final payoff is determined by the average payoff of 30 rounds in our experiment.  
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prominently different between ethnicities. Interestingly, the contributions in the first round over all three 
sessions were very close among ethnicities and are approximately 1/3 of the endowments (17RMB (2.8US$)), 
which demonstrated an imprinted tendency to cooperate. Afterwards, the ethnic Bouyei and Han exhibited a 
declining trend with strong regularity, as observed in previous studies. We believed that this less cooperative 
behavior arose from the gradual mistrust in others over time rather than out of punishment of others6. The 
mistrust led to the instinctive human desire for self-preservation which is the fundamental behavioral 
principle of humanity under ‘Hobbes Jungle’ that approximates our design with absence of formal social norm 
(such as no design of punishment rules) argued by Hobbes T and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (this argument is 
cited from Meng Li, 2013). However, even under the mechanism of information feedback, the cooperation 
level of the ethnic Zang roughly showed a rising trend. Additionally, in contrast to the ex ante unknown 
number of periods (Fehr and Gächter, 2000), we deliberately designed the experiment with ex ante known 
and found that the most generous cooperation occurred at the final round for the ethnic Zang and Bouyei. 
Some other studies have also detected the same phenomenon in experiments and explained that many 
subjects are willing to have a final attempt (Zhou and Song, 2008). Nevertheless, we provided a plausible 
reason, on the basis of our informal return visit, that some subjects who contributed less over time would feel 
guilt that they had reduced the group’s payoff once. This may led to the highest contributions of them out of 
the intention of compensation at the final round.  
 
B. Do behavioral differences between group structures exist? And ethnic difference in contribution 
depends on group structure?  
Result B: Ethnic diversity did not necessarily reduce the level of cooperation, and ethnic dominance may pose 
a greater barrier to cooperation. However, ethnic dominance merely had an overall effect; i.e., it decreased 
contributions of all subjects in GS3 and did not change the subjects’ relative contribution between the group 
structures in which his/her ethnicity was designed as dominant and minor ones. There were remarkable 
ethnic differences in contributions in most situations, and the two largest differentiations both appeared in 
the GS3 (between the Zang and other two ethnicities). However, when subjects acted as minor ethnicities in 
GS3, the differences between ethnicities vanished.  
 
A few studies have shown that ethnic diversity frequently reduces team performance in both public and 
private sectors (Watson, Kumar and Michaelsen, 1993; Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin, 1999; Pitts and Jarry, 
2007; Castro, 2008; Hur, 2013), whereas the conservative estimates of the experimental study by Waring and 
Bell (2013) indicates that ethnic dominance has a much larger negative effect on contributions in the public 
goods experiment than does caste diversity in India. We found multi-faceted results for different ethnicities in 
our study. Statistical power analysis of the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U(MWU) test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that contributions of the ethnic Zang between group structures come from the same distribution, 
which means ethnic diversity has no significant effect on the level of cooperation of ethnic Zang (the mean 
contributions in GS1, GS2 and GS3 were 16.7RMB (2.74US$), 17.4RMB (2.85US$) and 16.9RMB (2.77US$), 
respectively). However, we found that contributions were significantly different between all group structures 
for ethnic Bouyei, which confirms group structure-bias (the mean contributions in GS1, GS2 and GS3 were 
15.0RMB (2.46US$), 18.5RMB (3.03US$) and 13.2RMB (2.16US$), respectively). The mean level of 
contribution in GS2 was the statistically highest, which suggests that the ethnic Bouyei regard a group 
structure composed of their own ethnicity members more favorably than the other two group structures. By 
contrast, ethnic diversity promoted the cooperation of ethnic Han (the mean contributions in GS1, GS2 and 
GS3 were 17.5RMB (2.87US$), 15.8RMB (2.59US$) and 13.6RMB (2.23US$), respectively). We may thus 
conclude that the ethnic interactions entail additional complexities rather than one single law. The statistical 
results from the ethnic Han conflict with the conjecture that the lowest level of cooperation would appear in 
GS1: GS1 had the highest degree of diversity but prior researchers have suggested that humans cooperate 
more with in-group members (de Cremer and Vugt, 1999; Goette et al., 2006).  
                                                          
6 However, another possible reason to explain the reduction in contribution over time is that subjects are willing to punish free-riders. 
The less contribution he/she makes to the group account, the less payoff is received by the free-riders from free-riding. This is a potential 
way to punish free-riders in public good experiments without a punishment mechanism design, and humans reciprocate wrongs by 
harming the offender, even at a cost to themselves (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; de Quervain, Fischbacher, Treyer, Schellhammer, Schnyder, 
Buck, Fehr, 2004). However, we believe subjects’ motivation to reduce contributions is out of gradual mistrust in others rather than 
punishment of free-riders, according to our informal callback survey that inquired about the motivation of subjects to reduce 
contributions. 
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In contrast, ethnic dominance may pose a greater barrier to cooperation than ethnic diversity, and 
cooperation is much more likely to be determined by interactions at a finer scale (Posner, 2004; Waring and 
Bell, 2013); we found that mean contributions in GS3 were lower than the other two group structures for the 
ethnic Bouyei and Han. We further computed P-values from MWU to compare the contributions of subjects 
when acting as a dominant and as a minor affiliation in GS3. We found an interesting result: although ethnic 
dominance decreased cooperation, contributions under the two situations were not significantly different 
(p=0.14, 0.56 for the ethnic Bouyei and Han, respectively). This result revealed that the only overall effects of 
ethnic dominance were that selfish-bias was more likely to be elicited by all members and the reduction in 
contributions affects all members rather than only the subjects from minor affiliations. This leaves open the 
possibility that people may be sensitive to the terms of the group structure (in terms of being a ‘diverse 
group’, ‘homogeneous group’ or ‘one ethnic affiliation dominant group’) rather than his/her ethnic affiliation 
status in terms of the composition of ethnic population.  
 
We also found the evidence that group structure played an important role in determining the ethnic 
difference in contribution. The two greatest contribution gaps appeared in GS3 (between the ethnic Zang and 
Bouyei, differences in mean contributions in GS1, GS2 and GS3 were 1.7RMB (0.28US$), -1.1RMB (-0.18US$) 
and 3.7 RMB (0.61US$), respectively) and between the ethnic Zang and Han, and the greater contribution 
gaps appear in GS2 than GS1 (differences in average contributions in GS1, GS2 and GS3 were -0.8RMB (-
0.13US$), 1.6RMB (0.26US$) and 3.3RMB (0.54US$), respectively). Besides, we found an interesting result 
that acting as the minor ethnicity in GS3, there were insignificant differences in contribution between 
ethnicities, i.e., the behaviors of all ethnicities exhibited consistency (p=0.19 between Zang and Bouyei, and 
p=0.64 between Bouyei and Han). The evidence from our experiment confirmed the importance of degree of 
ethnic diversity (or ethnic dominance) in determining ethnic differences on cooperative behavior.  
 
C. What forms of prosocial preferences are elicited in the experiment and was there any difference in 
their intensity between ethnicities? 
Result C: Reciprocity preference was generally observed over all group structures for all ethnicities, and it 
appeared to be stronger in GS1 than in GS2. The ethnic Zang generally showed larger coefficient of Guess than 
the other two ethnicities, which indicated their stronger reciprocity preference. Moreover, the results showed 
that subjects may harbor other forms of prosocial preferences besides reciprocity as the significant 
coefficients of AVRealit-1 , and a comparison of coefficients’ size indicated that ethnic Bouyei and Zang reacted 
more intensively than the ethnic Han. 
 
We divided the panel data by ethnic affiliation and estimated the following Eq.(2), which captured the panel 
data dynamics for the contributions. Eq.(2) explained subject’s contributions in terms of their own past 
contributions, their guesses about average contributions and the lagged average contribution of group 
members. We used generalized method of moments (GMM) to ensure the consistency of the parameter 
estimates of the corresponding dynamic panel data structures. 
, 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 1 , (2)i t i t i t i t i i tCB CB Guess AVReal             
Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov (2006) decompose prosocial preferences in dictator and trust games by phase-
sequence design and define trustor’s expected value of the fraction returned by trustee as an independent 
variable of trust, which we infer may explain the conditional preference, i.e., reciprocity. Similarly, the guess 
value was regarded as a proxy indicator measuring the intensity of reciprocal  preference in our experiment. 
More contributions would be made as a result of more expected contributions from others. The results 
showed that reciprocal preference was observed over nearly all group structures and was strongest in GS1 
for all ethnicities, which remarkably indicated that subjects reciprocated more in ethnically diverse than in 
ethnically homogeneous groups (See Table 4). This result contradicted our expectation that the strongest 
reciprocity would occur in GS2. Although acting as minor affiliations in GS3, the ethnic Bouyei and Han also 
exhibited strong reciprocal preferences. By contrast, for the ethnic Zang, the contributions were uncorrelated 
with the guesses, which demonstrated the constant intensity of this preference: no matter how much the 
dominant ethnicity contributed to the group account, the contributions elicited by reciprocity preferences 
remained unchanged (p=0.28). On the whole, the ethnic Zang may have a stronger reciprocal preference 
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because the coefficients of ‘Guess’ were generally larger in magnitude than other two over all group 
structures. 
 
We were able to trace unconditional prosocial preferences by specifying lagged AVRealit-1 in regression 
models. The lagged AVRealit-1 was expected to be uncorrelated with CB because the groups were randomly 
assigned in each round. However, the result conflicted with our expectation in GS2. The negative sign of the 
coefficients of lagged AVRealit-1 demonstrate that the lower average contribution to the group account in the 
last round increased one’s contribution in the following round even if the group had been randomly 
reassigned. The subjects may harbor unconditional emotions such as earning inequality aversion, hoping that 
earning was fairly assigned to the members of his/her own ethnicity when they lie in a homogeneous group, 
and this allowed us to conjecture that a shared ethnic affiliation may serve as coordination devices for shared 
expectations, namely the pursuit of earning equality. A comparison of the size of the coefficients between the 
ethnicities suggests that the ethnic Bouyei and Zang reacted more intensively than the ethnic Han.  
 
The Results of Assessing the Explanatory Power of Culture: After discussing the differences in prosocial 
behavior between ethnicities based on the public good provision experiment, next we identified the cultural 
explanatory variables for the behavioral differences, and we conducted our analysis as follows: (1) First we 
examined whether the ethnic affiliation itself predicted the observed behavioral difference. To accomplish 
this task, we regressed the contribution to the group account exclusively on subject ethnic affiliation and 
other variables controlling for individual characteristics because ethnic affiliation is considered to be 
aggregative predictor for culture and is normally characterized in terms of culture (Betancourt and Lopez, 
1993) (See results of Model 1 in Table 6). Regressing the contribution on a dummy variable for subject ethnic 
affiliation resulted in coefficients with strong explanatory power (the ethnic affiliation predicted differences 
in contributions between the ethnic Zang and Bouyei at 1% significance and between the ethnic Zang and Han 
at 5% significance). Additionally, we also found that two variables of individual characteristics, major and 
gender, were responsible for the cooperative behavior.  
 
(2) Although ethnic affiliation per se provided strong explanatory power, our task was to investigate how 
culture operated. We decomposed the conception of culture into five dimensions grouped by measurable 
variables and then measured their ability to explain behavioral differences (‘Participation’, ‘Outgroup 
Rejection’, ‘Religion’, ‘Market Interaction’ and ‘Centralization of Power’). Before carrying out this measurement, 
we assessed to what extent cultural differences exist between ethnicities in terms of their responses to these 
cultural questions. We subjected each group of items to separate factor analysis and used the Varimax 
rotation method to obtain parsimonious factor solutions and retained only those with eigenvalues greater 
than 1.5 (these factors and the individual items that constitute them are outlined in Appendix A). Afterwards, 
a series of Mann-Whitney tests were conducted on differences in scores between ethnicities (See Table 5). 
The results showed that there was no significant difference in terms of PC (‘Participation’) in a range of 
voluntary associations (p= 0.26 for Zang vs. Bouyei; p= 0.13 for Bouyei vs. Han; p=0.71 for Han vs. Zang) as 
well as OR (‘outgroup rejection’) in a range of living environments with different types of neighbors (p=0.86 
for Zang vs. Bouyei; p=0.18 for Bouyei vs. Han; p=0.28 for Han vs. Zang) between all ethnicities. Moreover, we 
found the ethnic Zang and Han were statistically the most and least religious respectively based on the 
comparison of RL (‘Religion’). We also found that the ethnic Han showed the highest level of involvement in 
market economies (‘Market Interaction’) , but there was no evidence of differences between the ethnic Bouyei 
and Zang (p= 0.9 for Zang vs. Bouyei; p=0.10 for Bouyei vs. Han; p=0.09 for Han vs. Zang). Finally, the ethnic 
Zang also exhibited a higher degree of centralization of power of family (‘Centralization of Power’, p= 0.04 for 
Zang vs. Bouyei; p= 0.57 for Bouyei vs. Han; p<0.01 for Han vs. Zang). We dropped the insignificant cultural 
factors, PC and OR, and then regressed the contribution on the remaining ones and their interaction terms 
with ethnic affiliation, while still keep ethnic affiliation and other variables controlling for individual 
characteristics in the regression model (see the results of Model 2 in Table 6),  
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12= + (3)
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
CB RL MI CP EA RL EA MI
EA CP EA MJ GD EP EY GS
     
       
       
      
 
By decomposing culture, The results showed that the cultural factors also provided powerful predictors, 
based on the observed significant values of interaction terms (cultural factors interacted with ethnic 
affiliation); however, once they are specified in the regression model, the values of the coefficients of EA 
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(ethnic affiliation) varied significantly, but the adjusted R2 varied relatively little (the adjusted R2 of Model 1 
and Model 2 were 0.29 and 0.35, respectively, and the coefficients of individual characteristic variables were 
not sensitive to this change). This may imply multicollinearity, and therefore we next regressed EA on all 
cultural factors and found all of them were significantly correlated to EA. This result may suggest that a 
particular set of measurable variables identified in our survey is capable of serving as proxies for the cultural 
influences on economic behavior7. Interestingly, we found the differences in the three dimensions of culture, 
RL, MI and CP may not give rise to the behavioral differences between the two minor ethnicities (the ethnic 
Zang and Bouyei (all the coefficients of the three dimensions interacted with ethnic affiliation were 
insignificant at 10%)), whereas the impacts of cultural differences on behavioral differences are generally 
strong between the two minor ethnicities and the ethnic Han (the coefficients of EA×RL and EA×MI are 
significant at 1%, and the coefficients of EA×CP is significant at 10% between the ethnic Zang and Han). The 
negative effect of its interaction with ethnic affiliation indicates that religious attitudes of the minor ethnicity 
may influence economic prosocial behavior more strongly than among the ethnic Han. Although the role of a 
religion might depend highly upon ethnic affiliation, it operates in different ways.  
 
Ethnic Zang believe in Mahayana Buddhism that people pray for delivering all living creatures from torment 
as the highest priority of spiritual practice rather than for themselves (which is the practice of ethnic Han) 
(Hua, 2013) that may induce stronger economic prosociality. Ethnic Bouyi practice polytheistic worship 
(State Nationalities Affairs Commission, 2008) and we conjecture this religious sentiment that reveres the 
nature influences the prosocial disposition. The result from the negative sign and strong significance of the 
coefficients for MI deviates from the finding of Henrich et al (2001) and suggests that more self-regarding 
preferences may be elicited by higher level of market interactions. Nevertheless, a self-regarding preference 
is elicited less for the two minor ethnicities compared to the ethnic Han by market interaction because only 
the interaction effect between EA3 and MI is significant and has a positive coefficient. The same is true for 
centralization of power of a family. The larger magnitude of CP indicates that the subjects who suffer more 
from tyranny in family relations may behave in a more other-regarding manner because we found the sign of 
CP was positive and significant at 1%, and the effect of CP on prosocial behavior differed weakly depending 
on the subject’s ethnic affiliation. The negative sign of the interaction effect between ethnic affiliation and 
centralization of power of a family (EA3×CP) means CP had less impact on the two minor ethnicities compared 
to the ethnic Han.  
 
(3) Actually, we had not addressed GS (group structure), which we viewed as a very important implicit 
cultural factor for measuring ethnic identity (ethnic prejudice). We generated various composition of groups 
in terms of ethnic proportions to determine indirectly how ethnic identity (or prejudice) as an additional 
cultural factor accounts for behavioral differences. To accomplish this task, we ran another regression model 
including group structure as a dummy variable (See results of Model 3 in Table 6). We noticed that the results 
of Model 2 and Model 3 were robust in terms of sign, magnitude and statistical significance of coefficients for 
the previous five cultural factors and their interactions with ethnic affiliation and variables of individual 
characteristics as well. However, the values of the coefficients of EA (ethnic affiliation) varied significantly 
accordingly, whereas the adjusted R2 of the model varied only slightly (the adjusted R2 of Model 2 and Model 3 
were 0.35 and 0.42, respectively). We then regressed EA on all the cultural factors as well as GS and found 
that EA had a significant correlation with GS. This also suggests that GS is capable of accounting for EA. These 
results of analysis from Model 3 confirmed what we detected from the economic experiment in a statistical 
manner that group structure was responsible for the behavioral differences on the basis of the significant 
coefficients of the interaction term (EA×GS). For example, the statistical results showed that as the differences 
in contributions in GS1 between the ethnic Zang and other two ethnicities are defined as reference points 
(EA2×GS1, EA3×GS1), the switch of group structure from GS1 to GS2 induced an increase in contribution 
differences between the ethnic Zang and Bouyei (the coefficient is 3.16 significance at 5%) and a decrease in 
contribution differences between the ethnic Zang and Han (the coefficient is -2.62 significance at 10%). The 
plausible reason was the sentiment towards ethnic composition varies in ethnic affiliation that leads to 
behavioral difference. As a whole, all cultural factors were responsible for behavioral differences between the 
ethnic Han and the two minor ethnicities (the interaction effect between any of the cultural factors was 
                                                          
7 The adjusted R2 of the regression model is far below 1 also indicated there were still other potential variables accounting for culture 
that we did not identify.    
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significant at 10% at least), and it was interesting that the behavioral difference was attributed to the group 
structure between the two minor ethnicities only. 
 
 
 
3. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
A number of public good provision experiments confirm the existence of prosocial behavior because the 
contribution proportions are more than nothing, but interestingly, it declines with repetition and converges 
to lower levels (Isaac, Walker and Thomas, 1984; Andreoni, 1988; Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans, Schram and 
Offerman, 1999; Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001). Other mechanisms need to be developed to prevent 
the reduction of public good provisions in the game, such as voluntary punishment (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin 
and Sefton, 1994; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005; 
Bochet, Page and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, Bowles, Gintis and Hwang, 2009; Choi and Ahn,2003) and full 
refund rules (Isaac, Schmidtz, Walker, 1989; Bagnoli and McKee, 1991). However, we found evidence of a 
roughly increasing trend over time for ethnic Zang in a game without any anti-declining mechanism8, even if 
they expected self-regarding behavior in strangers. In contrast, the other two ethnicities presented clearly 
declining trends of contributions, which exhibited the more self-regarding preference over time in 
comparison. Group structure varying in ethnic composition strengthens the fascination regarding human 
nature. It appears, based on our data, that three distinct degrees of ethnic diversity (or ethnic dominance), i.e., 
compositions of groups in terms of ethnic proportions, influence cooperative behavior in different ways, and 
we found diverse results. Evolutionary theory suggests that humans have evolved to create ethnic groups for 
stabilized cooperation and solving collective action problems related to adaptive challenges (Wilson and 
Wilson, 2007; Waring and Bell, 2013). However, ethnic dominance posed a remarkably greater barrier to 
cooperation than ethnic divisions between group structures for the ethnic Bouyei and Han. Reduction in 
ethnic diversity to homogeneous groups (from GS1 to GS2) did not increase contributions for the ethnic Zang 
and Han compared to the increase for the ethnic Bouyei.  
 
Moreover, it was noteworthy that the term of ethnic composition (‘diverse’, ‘homogeneous’ or ‘dominant’ 
which can be collectively termed as ‘group structure-bias’) may play a more important role in determining 
behavioral patterns than ‘individual-bias’(due to identity or prejudice to individuals out of his/her ethnic 
affiliation as some studies claim (Becker, 1957, 1993; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2014)) because we found that 
subjects of the two minor ethnicities acting as the dominant ethnicity in GS3 contributed much less than they 
did in GS1. Meanwhile, we also found that the ethnic Han contributed more in GS1 than in GS2, in contrast to 
the argument that ethnic identity is a means to create boundaries that enable a group to distance themselves 
from one another (Barth, 1969). Additionally, by using guess values as an independent variable to isolate 
reciprocity preferences from other possible forms of prosocial preference using model regression, we found 
clear evidence that the reciprocity norm was behaviorally relevant. The reciprocity preference exists in all 
ethnicities across all group structures because marginal effects of Guessit were generally over 0.5; overall, the 
ethnic Zang exhibited the strongest reciprocity preference. Moreover, there was clear evidence in our data 
that were other forms of prosocial preference besides reciprocity, as demonstrated by the negative 
correlation between CBit and lagged AVRealit-1 in GS2. In general, we have shown based on the results of the 
experiments that people may harbor various forms of prosocial emotions in economic affairs, and especially 
exhibit stronger at the initial phase rather than what the textbook representation of Homo economics 
predicts. 
 
Culture is a useful variable to uncover economic behavior, and a stream of studies is in favor of this viewpoint 
(e.g., Chuah, Hoffmann, Jonesb and Williams, 2009). We found supportive evidence from our empirical results 
that a particular set of measurable factors identified as proxies for cultural influence statistically accounted 
for ethnic differences in prosocial behavior. A wave of recent studies confirm the impact of religion on 
prosociality; religious people demonstrate highly prosocial behavior (Georgianna, 1984; Darley and Batson, 
                                                          
8 Actually, we designed an aid-declining mechanism in the game, namely an information feedback mechanism, in which subjects received 
information about payoffs and partners’ contributions until the end of the experiment, and the evidence from Neugebauer T, Perote J, 
Schmidt U and Malte L (2009) suggest that this mechanism is destructive to efficiency.   
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1973, Bushman et al., 2007; Saroglou et al., 2009). However, it facilitates in different manners as the 
differences in doctrine and variability in concerned deities and this may also influence prosociality.  
 
Our results on the market interaction from the whole sample contradicted the findings of Henrich et al. 
(2001), which found strong evidence that prosocial norms increase with greater market integration and other 
studies also confirm the positive impact of market-based elements, such as competitiveness and market-
centric language, on prosocial preferences (Chen, 2010; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2013). However, when we regressed 
the three ethnic affiliation samples separately, the results were multi-faceted. The results showed that the 
coefficients of MI are negative (-1.54 (p<0.01) for the ethnic Zang and -0.65 (p=0.09) for the ethnic Bouyei), 
whereas it is positive for the ethnic Han (1.33 (p<0.01)). We made an informal return visit to subjects to 
inquire about their views on this. Interestingly, we received the unanimous response of two minor ethnicities 
that they did not have faith in the power of the market economy to develop prosocial norms. They considered 
the market economy to be filled with deception, mistrust and mutual hurt, and expect it to induce 
indifference, callousness and the moral decline of human nature. However, the ethnic Han stated that the 
market economy achieves reciprocity. As the ethnic Han are more involved in the market economy, based on 
the larger magnitude of MI, we believed it may give rise to stronger reciprocal preferences. Few studies have 
addressed the impact of centralization of family authority with reference to the impact of democracy and 
freedom on individual prosocial preference, as we have learned. Weber, Unterrainer and Schmid (2009) 
investigate whether organizational democracy influences the development of a social-moral climate and 
prosocial behavioral orientation, and the findings suggest that as the level of participation in decision-making 
processes increase, higher levels of prosocial and community-related behavioral orientations (characterized 
by behaviors such as mutual help and solidarity) are exhibited. By contrast, other research on children’s 
prosocial behavior claims that the degree of democracy in the family is irrelevant to prosociality (Li, 2000). 
However, our results from this economic experimental study suggest on the contrary that lower participation 
in decision-making of significant family affairs induced by centralized authority was associated with higher 
levels of economic prosociality and may impact minor ethnicities more because the results showed a positive 
sign of coefficient of CP and a negative sign of coefficient of the interaction term, EA3×CP, although it is 
relatively weak. These findings from the economic anatomy of culture support the contention that some 
dimensions of culture play an important role in affecting the cooperative behavior, and more crucially, they 
may have different marginal effects in magnitude between ethnicities and may even affect in opposite ways as 
what we have detected from the results of MI. It shows the diverse ways of cultural influence in shaping 
prosocial behaviors between ethnicities. 
 
The research limitations of our study lie particularly in the design of the questions on religion, market 
interaction and centralization power of family, which were relatively crude and therefore may have impacted 
or influenced the interpretation of the findings. The definition of the word ‘god’ varies throughout the various 
religious traditions of China; for example, the ethnic Zang believe in the Indian Mahayana form of Buddhism, 
whereas the ethnic Bouyei believes in many gods (e.g., River, Lake or Pond). There are probably different 
affect and comprehension of gods across ethnicities; further work is necessary to make distinguishing 
questionnaires on the basis of notions of god. We merely selected necessary questions to measure market 
interaction and ignored other economic variables such as capital loans. The centralized authority of family 
may take the form of imposing values on family members, and it should also be considered. Additionally, we 
only addressed some dimensions of culture in terms of prosociality by measurable variables; more complete 
approach is required to explore the missing dimensions of culture.  
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Table 1: Descriptions of variables 
Variable Description 
CB 
 Contribution to group 
account 
Z-CB 
Mean contribution to group account of all ethnic Zang subjects 
over 10 rounds in all sessions 
By-CB 
Mean contribution to group account of all ethnic Bouyei 
subjects over 10 rounds in all sessions 
H-CB 
Mean contribution to group account of all ethnic Han subjects 
over 10 rounds in all sessions 
Total-CB 
Mean contribution to group account of all subjects over 10 
rounds in all sessions 
Guess 
Guess value of mean 
group contribution 
Z-Guess 
Mean guess value of all ethnic Zang subjects over 10 rounds in 
all sessions 
By-Guess 
Mean guess value of all ethnic Bouyei subjects over 10 rounds in 
all sessions 
H-Guess 
Mean guess value of all ethnic Han subjects of over 10 rounds in 
all sessions 
Total-Guess Mean guess value of all subjects over 10 rounds in all sessions 
AVReal Mean contribution to group account of five subjects in a group  
GS 
Group Structure  
GS1=‘diverse group’;  
GS2=‘homogeneous group’; 
GS3=‘one ethnic affiliation dominant group’ 
EA Ethnic affiliation 
PC Cooperation 
OR Outgroup Rejection 
RL Religion 
MI Market interaction 
CP Centralization of power of a family 
MJ Major 
GD Gender 
EP Expenditure monthly 
EY Average years of education of family members  
t, t-1 The t period, one period lagged   
 
Table 2: Test on differences in contributions between three group structures. 
Group 
Structures 
GS1 VS. GS2 GS2 VS. GS3 GS3 VS. GS1 
Ethnicity Zang Bouyei Han Zang Bouyei Han Zang Bouyei Han 
Mann-Whitney 
Test 
-0.37 
(0.70) 
-3.70 
(0.00) 
*** 
1.36 
(0.17) 
 0.36 
 
(0.71) 
6.16 
(0.00) *** 
3.01 
(0.00) 
*** 
-0.02 
(0.98) 
1.91 
(0.05)** 
3.94 
(0.000) 
*** 
a Z-values in parentheses. * coefficient is significantly different from zero at 0.10 level. ** coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at 0.05 level. *** coefficient is significantly different from zero at 0.01 level. 
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Table 3: Test on differences in contributions between ethnicities in various group structures. 
Ethnicity Zang vs. Bouyei  Bouyei vs. Han  Han vs. Zang  
Group Structure GS1 GS2 GS3 GS1 GS2 GS3 GS1 GS2 GS3 
Mann-Whitney 
Test 
2.03 
(0.04) ** 
-1.186 
(0.235) 
3.89 
(0.00) 
*** 
-1.78 
(0.07) 
* 
3.82 
(0.00) 
*** 
0.14 
(0.88) 
0.27 
(0.78) 
1.78 
(0.07) 
* 
4.21 
(0.00) 
*** 
a P-values in parentheses. *coefficient is significantly different from zero at 0.10 level. **coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at 0.05 level. ***coefficient is significantly different from zero at 0.01 level. 
 
Table 4: Results of panel data regression 
    Ethnicity 
Dependent 
variable 
Zang Bouyei Han 
CBit GS1 GS2 GS3 
Minor 
GS1 GS2 GS3 
Minor 
GS1 GS2 GS3 
Minor 
Independent 
Variable 
         
CBit-1 0.18 
(0.00) *** 
0.17 
(0.00) *** 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
-0.08 
(0.12) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
*** 
-0.28 
(0.00) 
*** 
0.35 
(0.00) 
*** 
0.16 
(0.01) 
*** 
0.24 
(0.10)* 
Guessit 0.95 
(0.00) *** 
0.82 
(0.00) *** 
0.16 
(0.28) 
0.77 
(0.00) *** 
0.63 
(0.00) 
*** 
0.76 
(0.00) 
*** 
1.10 
(0.00) 
*** 
0.60 
(0.00) 
*** 
0.54 
(0.00) 
*** 
AVRealit-1 -0.10 
(0.27) 
-0.23 
(0.05)** 
0.09 
(0.59) 
-0.20 
(0.33) 
-0.29 
(0.04)** 
-0.33 
(0.01) 
*** 
-0.33 
(0.23) 
-0.19 
(0.07)* 
-0.08 
(0.67) 
Intercept 0.04 
(0.98) 
3.93 
(0.07)* 
13.94 
(0.00) 
9.04 
(0.00) *** 
6.30 
(0.02)** 
11.36 
(0.00) 
*** 
-1.04 
(0.62) 
4.87 
(0.00) 
*** 
4.57 
(0.24) 
a ‘GS3 Minor’ refers to samples that consist of subjects as minor ethnicities in GS3.  
b P-values in parentheses. *coefficient is significantly different from zero at 0.10 level. **coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at 0.05 level. ***coefficient is significantly different from zero at 0.01 level. 
Table 5: Results of the factor analysis of social survey 
Factor Eigenvalue of Factor1 Mean Score of Factor 1 
Zang Bouyei Han 
PC 2.06 0.07 -0.22 0.14 
OR 1.84 -0.06 -0.11 0.17 
RL 4.68 0.84 -0.25 -0.59 
MI 1.51 -0.17 -0.13 0.27 
CP 2.32 0.46 -0.11 -0.30 
 
Table 6: Ordinary least squares regression result for contribution. 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Contribution 
Regression Models  
 Model 1 
(Ethnic affiliation 
only ) 
Model 2 
(Ethnic affiliation + 
Culture ) 
Model 3  
(Ethnic affiliation + 
Culture  
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  + Group structure) 
EA×RL EA2×RL  -0.41 (0.65) -0.41 (0.64) 
EA3×RL  -2.86 (0.00)*** -2.86 (0.00) *** 
EA×MI  EA2×MI  0.09 (0.87) 0.09 (0.87) 
 EA3×MI  2.07 (0.00) *** 2.07 (0.00) *** 
EA×CP EA2×CP  0.15 (0.80) 0.15 (0.80) 
EA3×CP  -0.77 (0.06)* -0.77 (0.06) * 
RL    1.52 (0.00) *** 1.52 (0.00) *** 
MI    -0.93 (0.04)** -0.93 (0.04) ** 
CP    1.28 (0.00) *** 1.28 (0.00) *** 
EA EA2  -1.16 (0.00) *** -0.42 (0.00) *** 1.04 (0.00)*** 
EA3 -1.10 (0.02)** -0.35 (0.04) ** 0.77 (0.07)* 
MJ  -3.57 (0.00) *** -2.37 (0.00) *** -2.37 (0.00) *** 
GD  1.97 (0.00) *** 2.38 (0.00) *** 2.38 (0.00) *** 
EP  0.0004 (0.46) -0.00005 (0.93) -0.00005 (0.93) 
EY  -0.08 (0.23) -0.05 (0.48) -0.05 (0.48) 
GS GS2   0.41 (0.69) 
GS3   0.31 (0.76) 
EA× GS EA2×GS2   3.16 (0.02) ** 
EA3×GS2   -2.62 (0.06) * 
EA2×GS3   -1.60 (0.26) 
 EA3×GS3   -3.69 (0.00) *** 
Constant  17.26 (0.00) *** 15.16 (0.00) *** 14.92 (0.00) *** 
a ‘EA’ is a dummy variable and ethnic Zang is defined as a reference, ‘EA2’ and ‘EA3’ refer to the ethnic Bouyei 
and Han, respectively. 
b ‘GS’ is a dummy variable and the group structure GS1 are defined as a reference, ‘GS2’ and ‘GS3’ refer to the 
group structures, GS2 and GS3. 
c we classify all the majors as two categories, art and science. Thus, ‘MJ’ is a dummy variable and the majors 
belonging to art are defined as the reference.  
d ‘GD’ is a dummy variable and male is defined as the reference.  
e P-values in parentheses. *the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level. **the coefficient 
is significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. ***the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
0.01 level. 
 
Fig 1: Trends of contributions to group account over 10 rounds 
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Fig 2: Trends of guesses over 10 rounds 
 
Appendix A 
 
Prosocial Preference Survey 
Part A Participation   
 Answer for each organization 
and each activity  (1=Active; 
2=Inactive; 3=No): 
 (a1) Church or religious organization: 
(a2) Sport or recreational organization: 
(a3) Art, music or educational organization: 
(a4) Environmental organization: 
(a5) Petition signing: 
(a6) Boycotts: 
Part B Outgroup Rejection   
 Do you mind if you have these 
types of people as neighbors? 
(1=I don’t mind; 2= I don’t 
know; 3=Prefer not) 
 (b1) Criminals: 
(b2) Heavy drinkers: 
(b3) Immigrants/foreign workers: 
(b4) People who have AIDS: 
(b5) Drug addicts: 
(b6) Homosexuals: 
(b7) People significantly different in social 
status: 
(b8) People significantly different in 
wealth: 
Part C Religion   
 Extent of agreement on these 
conceptions: (1=Strongly 
disagree; 2= Disagree; 
3=Neutral; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly 
agree) 
 (c1) Belief in absoluteness of good and evil: 
(c2) Belief in necessity of religious 
upbringing: 
(c3) Belong to a religious denomination: 
(c4) Belief in god: 
(c5) Belief in life after death: 
(c6) Belief in soul: 
109 
 
(c7) Belief in heaven and hell: 
(c8) Belief in importance of religion in life: 
(c9) Belief in necessity of religion for 
human: 
(c10) Deriving comfort and strength from 
religion: 
Part D Market Interaction   
 What proportions of these  
necessities are purchased from 
markets (0% indicates the 
necessity is self-sufficient, while 
100% is totally purchased from 
market ) 
 (d1) Clothing; 
(d2) Food (Rice/noodle); 
(d3) Vegetables 
Part E Centralization of Power   
 Has some family member who 
makes decisions of these home 
affairs alone according to 
his/her family status (1= has; 
0=has not)  
 (e1) Significant economic affairs: 
(e2) Children's education: 
(e3) Children's marriage: 
Appendix B   
 
Experimental Instruction 
The instructions were read aloud by an experimenter as the students followed along on their computer 
screens.  
This is an experiment, funded by a research foundation to study decision making. The 
instructions are simple. If you follow them carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of 
money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of experiment and the amount you earn will 
depend on you and other’s decisions. Please make sure you understand the decision process and 
remember any communication is forbidden. 
Group 
You are about to participate experiment of a group decision-making that consists of three 
sessions, and every session includes 10 rounds, in other words, you will complete 30 rounds. 
During each round, you will be placed in a group with other four participants (a group of five). 
You will not know the identities of the other four members of your group in any given decision 
round, nor will you be told their identities after the experiment is over. At the beginning of each 
round, groups will be  randomly assigned that you have no chance to meet the same person in 
any other round, i.e., group composition will be randomly changed from round to round. 
Moreover, you will not know additional information that we will not provide during the whole 
process.     
Earnings 
You will receive an initial endowment of 50 token (1 token= 1RMB (0.16US$)) in each round 
and have to decide on the allocation of your endowment between a private and public good. Each 
token placed in private one earns one token back while each token placed to public good earn 0.5 
times token to each member of group. Your payoff will be determined as:  
 
 In addition to, you will be asked to guess the mean group contribution after decision-
making in allocation in each round. Your payoff from guessing will be determined as follows (in 
RMB):  
 
However, the calculation may be kind of complicated, note that the closer your guess is to 
the average group contribution, the higher is your payoff. Your total payoff in each round 
includes the payoff from the group decision as well as from guessing. At the end of the 
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experiment, your earning is the average total payoff in 30 rounds. In each round, you will allowed 
to have 2 minutes to make decision, and if it is not enough, please let us know and more minutes 
will be allowed.    
Scenarios  
You belong to a different ethnicity. The experiment includes three sessions and each session 
corresponds to a single scenario. The scenario in the first session is that all of you are randomly 
divided into several groups and have to be aware that you play in a group probably with 
participants from different ethnicities. In the second session, you play in a group in which all the 
other participants belong to the ethnicity of your own. At the beginning of each round in third 
session, we will randomly select several participants. If you are selected, you will play in a group 
with other four participants belong to an ethnicity different from yours, and if not, you will play 
in a group with four other participants, only one of whom belongs to a different ethnicity from 
yours.  
There will be some key questions which test whether you are familiar with the experiment 
institution. Our experimenters will check your answers and rectify the wrong ones with 
explanation, and if you have any more questions, please ask them before the experiment 
begins. 
GOOD LUCK! 
 
 
 
 
 
